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THE ROLE OF NATIONAL JUDGES IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION IN THE LIGHT OF
THE ANTITRUST DAMAGES’ DIRECTIVE (OR THE “INDIRECT EFFECTS” OF
DIRECTIVES BEFORE THE LAPSE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD,
ACCORDING TO THE CORTE DI CASSAZIONE)
In the annotated judgement, the Italian Corte di cassazione (hereinafter, the “CC”) seems to suggest
that the recently enacted directive on antitrust damages (whose analysis has been carried out here by
Prof. Rossi Dal Pozzo) enjoys a sort of “indirect effects” within the Italian legal order.
The case concerned a stand-alone damages action brought by a group of agricultural wholesalers
against the undertaking running the Rome general market. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
abused its dominant position on the (alleged) relevant market (i.e., the wholesale distribution market in
Rome),  by  imposing  restrictive  and  discriminatory  conditions.  Acting  as  a  first  instance  judge
(according to the original version of Article 33 l. 287/1990), the Rome Court of Appeal considered that
the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof, having failed to establish the contours of the relevant
(geographic) market. Although claiming that it was limited to the city of Rome, the plaintiffs supported
such  assumption  only  with  generic  elements  (“generici  riferimenti”).  With  no  definition  of  the
(geographic) relevant market, one cannot establish a dominant position, nor its abuse. The action was
therefore dismissed.
The CC annulled the judgement. Stressing out the differences between stand-alone and follow-on
actions, the Court acknowledges that antitrust damages actions require complex analysis, based on
evidence usually held by the defendants (or by third parties), and not accessible (or even known) by
the plaintiffs. In the light of this peculiarity of antitrust litigation (and recalled that reg. 1/2003 assigns to
national courts an essential role in applying EU competition rules), the CC affirms that the Court of
Appeal was wrong in mechanically applying (“meccanica applicazione”) the principle of onus probandi
incumbit ei qui dicit. According to the CC, the Court should have rather followed a sort of teleological
approach to the Italian rules of civil  procedure to ensure the compensation of the victims of the
antitrust violation. For example, the Court should have used all the investigative powers that the Italian
code of  civil  procedure assigned to the judges’  discretion,  such as the appointment of  technical
experts. The judgement suggests that this is necessary but not sufficient. Indeed, it seems mandatory,
as well,  that  technical  experts are empowered with particularly  intense investigative tools,  which
should include the competence to ex officio acquire and evaluate data and information in order to
establish the alleged breach of antitrust rules. According to the CC, this seems to be required by the
specific nature of antitrust litigation.
What matters here is that (the need of) this impressive and purpose-oriented approach to national civil
procedure seems to be rooted in the directive on antitrust damages. Indeed, the CC recalls many
provisions of the directive, and particularly those on the disclosure of evidence. Of course, the CC also
incidentally refers to the direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and even to the right to judicial
protection enshrined in Articles 19 TEU and 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(hereinafter, the “CFREU”). While doing so, however, the CC seems merely to repeat – the exact
wording of – some of the recitals of the directive. This reinforces the assumption that the judgement is
substantially based on the recognition of a sort of “indirect effect” of this piece of EU legislation.
Indeed, saying that a given EU measure has “indirect effect” means that national authorities (including
judges) shall interpret national legislation in the light of its provisions. This rationale represents a well-
established principle of EU law (Von Colson§ 26), also known as the duty of consistent interpretation.
The annotated decision would therefore not draw much attention, were it not for the fact that the CC
recognizes the existence of such duty well before the lapse of the directive’s implementation period
(27.12.2016). EU law does not impose such an obligation on Member States. National courts shall
interpret domestic law in accordance with directives only once that their transposition period expired
(Adeneler § 115). Before, directives only have a so-called blocking effect, i.e. Member States must
refrain from taking measures that may compromise the attainment of the directives’ results (Inter-
Environnement Wallonie § 45). The obligation applies to both national legislators and courts, the latter
having a sort of duty of “not-inconsistent interpretation”. This means that (i) until the lapse of the
transposition period, national judges do not have to interpret national law in accordance with the
directives, but (ii) from the date of the directives’ entrance into force, they must nonetheless refrain
from interpreting national law in a manner which might compromise the (future) attainment of the
objective pursued by the directives (Adeneler §§ 123-124).
Of course, EU law does not either prohibit Member States from anticipating the effects of the duty of
consistent interpretation. The CC has already followed this path with regard to the directive on the right
to  interpretation  and  translation  in  criminal  proceeding  (judgement  no.  5486,  12.7.2012).  This
approach poses however some questions, which cannot be fully addressed here.
On the one hand, it suffices to say that this solution seems to reduce (even more) the difference
between regulations and directives. If national courts consider themselves (and other national bodies)
bounded by the duty of consistent application before the lapse of the transposition period, Member
States shall essentially comply with directives since the date of their entrance into force. Inter alia, this
means that Member States shall bear the financial burden of compliance, in a period when this is not
required by  EU law.  On the  other  hand,  risks  that  are  (even)  more serious  arise  in  horizontal
situations. The bottom line is that the duty of consistent interpretation (mainly) aims at ensuring that
rights stemming from directives are not  prejudiced only because Member States do not  (timely)
comply with their obligation to transpose. In horizontal relationships, preserving the rights of a party
essentially means imposing obligations on the other, making its position worse. This is what happened
in the annotated judgement. The teleological interpretation according to which the Court of Appeal was
wrong in “mechanically applying” the burden of proof standard may favour the plaintiffs but clearly
jeopardizes the defendant. If this seems fair once that the implementation period expired, one can
doubt that the same holds true before that date (on these topics see Amalfitano–Condinanzi, Unione
europea: fonti, adattamento e rapporti tra ordinamenti, Torino, 2015).
In  a  different  perspective,  the  CC decision  seems  also  to  anticipate  a  more  fundamental  and
systematic question that Member States should consider while dealing with the damages directive’s
transposition. The judgement essentially says that the “specific nature” of antitrust litigation requires
national judges to use procedural rules in a “special manner”. The directive follows the same rationale.
It gives “special powers” to national courts in order to overcome the “specific obstacles” that have so
far jeopardized the development of private enforcement. The question is then why only competition
law should benefit from the enactment of these “special powers”. On the one hand, one can of course
rely on the quasi-constitutional role played by competition policy within the EU legal order, since the
very adoption of the Treaty of Rome. On the other, one can however doubt that protecting the victims
of antitrust violations more effectively than all the other victims of all the other tortious acts (including
situations characterized by information asymmetry quite similar to antitrust litigation) is fully consistent
with the principle of equality and the right to justice, enshrined in the constitutions of several Member
States (not to mention the CFREU). Member States should therefore consider the systematic impact
of the damages directive, while implementing it  within national legal orders (on these topics see
Munari, Judicial assessment of anticompetitive behaviour in Italy, in Cisotta–Marquis (eds.) Litigation
and Arbitration in EU Competition Law, Cheltenham, 2015).
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